It is not up to the school boardsthe very government entities whose race-based practices we must strictly scrutinizeto determine what interests qualify as compelling under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Western District of Washington dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. Section 2. We construe Brown as endorsing Mr. Justice Harlans classical statement in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 539: Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens). Jefferson County does not challenge our jurisdiction, Tr. The District argues that its use of race in high school admissions serves three compelling government interests: (1) the educational benefits of a diverse student body; (2) the reduction of racial isolation and de facto segregation; and (3) providing equality of opportunity to all students. The dissents assertion that these plans are necessary for the school districts to maintain their hard-won gains reveals its conflation of segregation and racial imbalance. He also wrote about the unsettled debate concerning whether racial balance or diversity has a positive effect on educational outcomes. 1961) (If men were angels, no government would be necessary). Identify the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that is most relevant These statements nowhere suggest that this freedom is limited to school districts where court-ordered desegregation measures are also in effect. 420, p.25. The legal showdown came in a landmark decision called Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. See Part II, supra, at 2137. Here again, though, the dissent overstates the data that supposedly support the interest. And even if the determination is difficult, it is one the dissent acknowledges must be made to determine what remedies school districts are required to adopt. of Cal. The histories that follow set forth these basic facts. And it used busing to transport the students to their new assignments. The Court made clear that [s]trict scrutiny does not trea[t] dissimilar race-based decisions as though they were equally objectionable. Ibid. Project Renaissance again revised the boards racial guidelines. The Chief Justice finally concludes his opinion by answering some of the issues raised by Justice Stephen Breyer in his dissent. Initially, as the Court explained just last Term, we are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue was not fully debated. Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356, 363 (2006). PDF The Interdependence of Housing and School Segregation See ante, at 31-32, n.16. The Seattle school district classifies children as white or nonwhite; the Jefferson County school district as black or other. In Seattle, this racial classification is used to allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools. The NAACPs First Legal Challenge and Seattles Response, 1969 to 1977. in No. Indeed, if there is no such plan, or if such plans are purely imagined, it is understandable why, as the plurality notes, ante, at 27, Seattle school officials concentrated on diminishing the racial component of their districts plan, but did not pursue eliminating that element entirely. Public School Dist., 34 (Apr. See Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Seattle School District No. During the period the tiebreaker applied, it typically affected about 300 students per year. For example, prior to our decision in School Comm. 1 (PICS): Resources On U.S. Supreme Court Voluntary School Desegregation Rulings The Civil Rights Project at UCLA", http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=05-908, "Justices Limit the Use of Race in School Plans for Integration", "Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice Roberts's Reinterpretation of, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Id., at 335336. PDF SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - Justia Law The plurality would decline their modest request. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 472, n.15 (1982), post, at 5657, but there this Court expressly noted that it was not passing on the propriety of race-conscious student assignments in the absence of a finding of de jure segregation. But if the plan was lawful when it was first adopted and if it was lawful the day before the District Court dissolved its order, how can the plurality now suggest that it became unlawful the following day? Attorney General, to John F. Kennedy, President (Jan. 24, 1963) (hereinafter Kennedy Report), available at http://www.gilderlehrman.org/search/collection_pdfs/05/63/0/05630.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June 26, 2007, and available in Clerk of Courts case file) (reporting successful efforts by the Government to induce voluntary desegregation). How does the Jefferson County School Board define diversity? A. 539 U. S., at 316, 335336. 67759, at 9 (Unlike the Massachusetts Court, the Illinois Supreme Court has recently held its law to eliminate racial imbalance unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); ibid., n.1. See Church of the Lukumi v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 54647 (1993); Florida Star v. B.J.F. See also Adarand, supra, at 226 ([I]t may not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign (quoting Bakke, supra, at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.))). See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342 (stating the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end point). 3 Seattle School Dist. 05915, at 38. The Court recognized that seeking diversity and avoiding racial segregation in schools are compelling state interests. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 371 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 2, p. 50 ([T]he state is deprived of any power to make any racial classifications in any governmental field). See ibid. Justice Thomas recoils at the suggestion that black students can only learn if they are sitting next to white students. I quote the Illinois Supreme Court at length to illustrate the prevailing legal assumption at the time Swann was decided. 1099&OrgType=4&reportLevel=School; http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us/ The Current Plan, 1999 to the Present. [S]chool authorities, the Court said, have wide discretion in formulating school policy, and . School authorities concerned that their student bodies racial compositions interfere with offering an equal educational opportunity to all are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion based solely on a systematic, individual typing by race. Jefferson County estimates that the racial guidelines account for only 3 percent of assignments. appeals for the sixth circuit. 233234 (Summer 2001) (describing this effect in schools in Charlotte, North Carolina). of Oral Arg. In 1956, two years after Brown made clear that Kentucky could no longer require racial segregation by law, the Louisville Board of Education created a geography-based student assignment plan designed to help achieve school integration. Percentage of Students in Minority Schools by Race, 20002001. These cases consider the longstanding efforts of two local school boards to integrate their public schools. in KentuckyThe Second Year After the Supreme Courts Decision, 25 J. Negro Educ. [Footnote 14]. The upshot is that these plans specific features(1) their limited and historically-diminishing use of race, (2) their strong reliance upon other non-race-conscious elements, (3) their history and the manner in which the districts developed and modified their approach, (4) the comparison with prior plans, and (5) the lack of reasonably evident alternativestogether show that the districts plans are narrowly tailored to achieve their compelling goals. Brief for Respondent at 3334. The District argues that under the Courts jurisprudence, strict scrutiny does not require sacrificing every other goal to that of avoiding the use of race, but that it requires a proper balancing of goals. 1806, 20 U. S.C. 7231 et seq. [Footnote 8]. 2d 834, 839840, and n. 6 (WD Ky. 2004) (McFarland I). In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law). See also Bakke, supra, at 312, 313 (opinion of Powell, J.). Rather, such powers should have been temporary and used only to overcome the widespread resistance to the dictates of the Constitution. 515 U. S., at 125 (Thomas, J., concurring). The District Court also adopted a complex desegregation plan designed to achieve the orders targets. Others have been more circumspect. The plurality should have remembered that historically only African-American students had been told where they could go to school. Similarly, Jefferson Countys use of racial classifications has only a minimal effect on the assignment of students. After preliminary rulings and an eventual victory for the plaintiffs in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the District Court in July 1975 entered an order requiring desegregation. But Louisville should be able to answer the relevant questions on remand. Cf. It is even more difficult to accept the pluralitys contrary view, namely that the underlying plan was unconstitutional. In Grutter, the Court gave significant deference to the University of Michigan Law Schools judgment that diversity was essential to achieving the schools educational mission. However, the actual hard-won gain in these cases is the elimination of the vestiges of the system of state-enforced racial separation that once existed in Louisville. 6704 (WD Wash., 1969), pp. No. App. Thus, Washington state voters enacted an initiative that amended state law to require students to be assigned to the schools closest to their homes. 05915, p. 48, but we are nonetheless obliged to ensure that it exists, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006). See Powell 35. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), we held that segregation deprived black children of equal educational opportunities regardless of whether school facilities and other tangible factors were equal, because government classification and separation on grounds of race themselves denoted inferiority. The long history of their efforts reveals the complexities and difficulties they have faced. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), also known as the PICS case, is a United States Supreme Court case which found it unconstitutional for a school district to use race as a factor in assigning students to schools in order to bring its racial composition in line with the composition of the district as a whole, unless it was remedying a prior history of de jure segregation. For his part, Justice Thomas faults my citation of various studies supporting the view that school districts can find compelling educational and civic interests in integrating their public schools. As becomes clearer when the districts plan is further considered, Jefferson County has explained how and when it employs these classifications only in terms so broad and imprecise that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny. When asked for a range of percentage that would be diverse, however, Seattles expert said it was important to have sufficient numbers so as to avoid students feeling any kind of specter of exceptionality. App. 1, pp. Five Supreme Court justices rejected voluntary desegregation plans in Seattle and . Student Choice, 1988 to 1998. See id., at 2428. Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause. The term racial imbalance refers to a ratio between nonwhite and other students in public schools which is sharply out of balance with the racial composition of the society in which nonwhite children study, serve and work. D (collecting citations of state and federal cases [w]hich [e]nunciate the [p]rinciple that [s]tate [l]aws [p]roviding for [r]acial [s]egregation in the [p]ublic [s]chools do not [c]onflict with the Fourteenth Amendment). in No. Thus, the programs are subject to the general rule that government race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional. It is the height of arrogance for Members of this Court to assert blindly that their motives are better than others. 6, 39 Ill. 2d 593, 597598, 237 N.E. 2d 498, 501 (1968) (citations omitted) (citing decisions from the high courts of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Jersey, California, New York, and Connecticut, and from the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits). School Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (CA4 1999); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 809 (CA1 1998). Finally, what of the hope and promise of Brown? Though Brown decisively rejected those arguments, todays dissent replicates them to a distressing extent. Perhaps recognizing that reliance on Grutter cannot sustain their plans, both school districts assert additional interests, distinct from the interest upheld in Grutter, to justify their race-based assignments. I do not know of any opinion which buoyed Marshall more in his pre-Brown days ). Over a period of several months in 20072008, JCPS developed a diversity plan based upon social economic and minority status (income of parents), a plan suggested by school board members Steve Imhoff and Larry Hujo in 2002. Id., at 494. 69. But our precedent has recognized that de jure discrimination can be present even in the absence of racially explicit laws. See App. School authorities are traditionally given broad discretionary powers to formulate and implement educational policy and may properly decide to ensure to their students the value of an integrated school experience. Citizens for Better Ed. 2005) (Parents IV). 693, 227 N.E.2d 729. About 68% received their first choice. friend of JOSHUA RYAN McDONALD, PETITIONER. In due course, the Washington Supreme Court, the Federal District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (sitting en banc) rejected the challenge and found Seattles plan lawful. Both, he explains, cannot be true. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 3, p.1617 (It is by such practical considerations based on experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of equal protection is to be answered (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 110 (1949))); Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. Yet, like so many other legal categories that can overlap in some instances, the constitutional distinction between de jure and de facto segregation has been thought to be an important one. The other plaintiffs all challenged assignments to certain specialized schools, and the District Court found these assignments, which are no longer at issue in this case, unconstitutional. Roberts concludes that racial balancing cannot be a compelling state interest. Second, the plurality downplays the importance of Swann and related cases by frequently describing their relevant statements as dicta. These criticisms, however, miss the main point. The dissent asserts that racially balanced schools improve educational outcomes for black children. Furthermore, it would leave our equal-protection jurisprudence at the mercy of elected government officials evaluating the evanescent views of a handful of social scientists. Pp. 1725, 2841. That policy was necessary because of numerous incidents of racial violence. Id., at 502; id., at 532534 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court in the seminal case Roe v. Wade made a jurisdictional ruling that although the plaintiff was no longer pregnant and thus technically the issue before the court was moot, given the short nature of pregnancy as compared to the length of the appellate process, requiring a continuing pregnancy for the satisfaction of the case or controversy requirement would effectively deny appellate review. . When the government classifies an individual by race, it must first define what it means to be of a race. No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 78 Stat. The District contends that its plan used the narrowest possible means to achieve is educational goals. [I]ntegration, we are told, has three essential elements. Ibid. ORAL ARGUMENT OF HARRY J.F. A to Kiner Affidavit in Seattle School Dist. The U.S. Constitution in Article III 2 specifies the scope of matters on which the federal courts can issue decisions. To begin with, Justice Breyer seeks to justify the plans at issue under our precedents recognizing the compelling interest in remedying past intentional discrimination. 05915, at 38 (Decisions to assign students to schools within each cluster are based on available space within the [elementary] schools and the racial guidelines in the Districts current student assignment plan); id., at 82 (acknowledging that a student may not be assigned to his or her resides school if it has reached the extremes of the racial guidelines). The Court did not say in Adarand or in Johnson or in Grutter that it was overturning Swann or its central constitutional principle. App. 1 Published: June 28, 2007 On June 28, 2007, the Supreme Court issued a split decision on integration in public schools in the consolidated cases of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. In the Justice's 77-page written opinion he called the ruling a "radical" step away from established law that would take from communities a critical tool used for many years in the prevention of resegregation. Richmond v. J. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U. S., at 237 ([S]trict scrutiny in this context is [not] strict in theory, but fatal in fact (quoting Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment))). I believe only that the Constitution allows democratically elected school boards to make up their own minds as to how best to include people of all races in one America. 1 of King County, Washington, and the Office for Civil Rights, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 2 (June 9, 1978); see also 45 CFR 80.7(c) (2006). 05908, 426 F.3d 1162; No. But it explicitly cited Swanns statement that the Constitution permitted a local district to adopt such a plan. Rev. 1, this Court struck down a state referendum that effectively barred implementation of Seattles desegregation plan and burden[ed] all future attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts throughout the State. Id., at 462463, 483. And stubborn facts of history linger and persist. 503 U. S., at 495. For instance, a Texas appeals court in 1986 rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a voluntary integration plan by explaining: [T]he absence of a court order to desegregate does not mean that a school board cannot exceed minimum requirements in order to promote school integration. Despite his argument that these cases should be evaluated under a standard of review that is not strict in the traditional sense of that word, post, at 36, Justice Breyer still purports to apply strict scrutiny to these cases. Kennedy argued that the government had an interest in ensuring racial equality: "The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.". Both school districts voluntarily used individualized racial classifications to achieve diversity and/or to avoid racial isolation through student assignment. 2d 304. I cannot rely upon Swanns statement that the use of race-conscious limits is permissible without showing, rather than simply asserting, that the statement represents a constitutional principle firmly rooted in federal and state law. Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for admission to public high schools? ([A]ll governmental action based on racea group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited, Hirabayashi [v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943)]should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed (first emphasis in original); Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 636 ([O]ur Constitution protects each citizen as an individual, not as a member of a group (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); Bakke, supra, at 289 (opinion of Powell, J.) Several of these cases were significantly more restrictive than Swann in respect to the degree of leniency the Fourteenth Amendment grants to programs designed to include people of all races. In many such instances, the contentious force of legal challenges to these classifications, meritorious or not, would displace earlier calm); post, at 65 (Indeed, the consequences of the approach the Court takes today are serious. One conference participant described white privilege as an invisible package of unearned assets which I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was meant to remain oblivious. 539 U. S., at 328. It applied that label to 26 schools, including 4 high schoolsCleveland (72.8% minority), Franklin (76.6% minority), Garfield (78.4% minority), and Rainier Beach (58.9% minority). It is not one in which race-conscious limits stigmatize or exclude; the limits at issue do not pit the races against each other or otherwise significantly exacerbate racial tensions. ); brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Brief for Petitioner at 3637. Id. The Court need not resolve the parties dispute over whether racial diversity in schools has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits because it is clear that the racial classifications at issue are not narrowly tailored to the asserted goal. 05915, at 97. No. That view understands the basic objective of those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices that lead to racial exclusion. Evidence from the Segregated Schooling of African American Children, in Beyond Desegregation 209226 (M. Shujaa ed. as Amici Curiae, with Rosen, Perhaps Not All Affirmative Action is Created Equal, N.Y. Electoral district lines are facially race neutral so a more searching inquiry is necessary before strict scrutiny can be found applicable in redistricting cases than in cases of classifications based explicitly on race (quoting Adarand, 515 U. S., at 213)). I shall apply the version of strict scrutiny that those cases embody. Quoting Justice Powells articulation of diversity in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 314315, the Grutter Court noted that it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, that can justify the use of race, 539 U. S., at 324325, but a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element, id., at 325.
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